. Sperlich (1971: 219) (Gamson, 1968: 2). These formulations strongly suggest differences in elite conflict orientations as a result of power position and role, as expressed in and influenced by the political culture. They suggest, also, hypotheses we should test with our data.
).
There are, of course, several assumptions underlying this earlier research, as well as the analysis presented here. We assume that the cognitions, perceptions, and evaluations of elites regarding social and political conflict are important orientations, and that if we can discover and understand them (we assume we can study them!) they will provide us with better knowledge about elite behavior and the nature of political life in the communities we study. They are presumably not transient, nor situational orientations but part of, clues to, a basic view of politics. Presumably also they influence leadership attitudes and performance, helping explain the variance which occurs in the attitudes and behavior of such leadership. Finally, we assume that cultural and systemic differences influence the pattern of elite conflict perceptions and evaluations that emerge when we do comparative analysis.
The history of scholarly discussion of social and political conflict is rich, and many great minds have addressed themselves to the &dquo;big questions&dquo; posed here. Robert Angell argued that for sociologists the beginning was Georg Simmel, particularly his piece on &dquo;The Sociology of Conflict&dquo; (1904 (Putnam, 1973: 93-4); others would start with the contrasting views of Hobbes and Marx. Elite theorists might well call our attention to the works of Mosca and Pareto, who recognized the conflict of interests in society, at least implicitly, while arguing for the eventual resolution of conflict leading to a new &dquo;balance of social forces&dquo; or a societal &dquo;equilibrium.&dquo; In the post-war years quite a few studies dealing with the subject of conflict appeared (see among others UNESCO, 1957; Coleman, 1957; Coser, 1956; Dahrendorf, 1959 Dahrendorf, , 1969 Lipset, 1960; McNeil, 1965;  Gamson, 1968; Janowitz, 1970) .
In the last decade there seems to have been less attention paid to the study of conflict internal to society than in the preceding decade and a half. More attention has been given recently to arms control, deterrence, and international conflict theory.
Our limited exposure to this body of literature leads us to suggest, rather hesitatingly, that many of the key issues raised by these scholars are still with us. Most people will agree with Dahrendorf's initial position, &dquo;Wherever there is human life, there is conflict ... , & d q u o ; but not everyone will agree with his second position, &dquo;by conflict alone the multitude and incompatibility of human interests and desires find adequate expression in a world of notorious uncertainty&dquo; (Dahrendorf, 1969: 138-40 (Lasswell, 1930: 197) . Sperlich (1971: 219) (Dahl, 1967: 261 (Gamson, 1968: 2). These (Szczepanski, 1984: 179 (Szczepanski, 1984: 185 Table I (Eldersveld, 1981: 240) . (Jacob, 1971: 307). The conclusion arrived at was that leaders believe conflict in Poland &dquo;is Let us attempt a summary of the differences in these two systems for the two clusters of cities included in this analysis (see Table 8 ). These data suggest that the basic differences between the local elites in these two systems occur over their perceptions of the seriousness of community problems, the types of such problems, and whether effective action is being taken. In addition, US elites are somewhat more pro-conflict in value preferences. But the data on conflict perceptions are very similar, as is the level of elite consensus.
Polish cities face a variety of problems and conflicts. What seems clear is that a large number of local leaders are concerned with &dquo;unsatisfied needs,&dquo; reflecting the that it is also intensified by the conventional normative structures: orientation toward interpersonal harmony, law and order. It is obvious that the denial or even the belittling of conflict in a situation where it is commonly held that conflict is increasing cannot be considered rational. Given such a situation, rational action requires an institutional settling of conflicts, and this necessitates the admission that conflict is both real and unavoidable. (Jasinska and Siemienska, 1982 discover. Other studies referred to earlier suggest that this may be the case. We will use here four individual level characteristics on which we have data for both countries.
The first theoretical concern relates to leadership position or role. The national elite study found that administrators were more concerned, indeed negative, about conflict than MP's. The question is whether we find this to be the case at the city level. The answer is a qualified yes (see Table 9 ). In the United States, department heads had almost the same level of awareness of conflict as mayors and council Table  10 ). Although one must be cautious with these data and remember the smaller number of cities included in the 1980-84 study, the &dquo;convergence&dquo; trend is suggestive.
In Politics, Jacob, 1971) will be referred to here as the "Values Project."
